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BRAGDON V. ABBOTT: EXTENDING THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT TO ASYMPTOMATIC INDIVIDUALS
EUGENIA Liu, J.D.*
INTRODUCTION
In Bragdon v. Abbott' the Supreme Court held that asymptomatic
HIV infection constitutes a disability within the parameters of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).2 By accepting asymptomatic
HIV infection as a "disability" under the ADA, Bragdon expanded the
scope of what qualifies as a "disability" to include a condition that ex-
hibits no clinical signs of the actual disease but is merely a precursor
to the actual disease.' This raises questions as to the potential inclu-
sion of other "asymptomatic" conditions under the ADA, such as the
presence of genetic alterations, that predispose a person to a particu-
lar disease but do not currently elicit medical complaints from the
carrier.4 In fact, the dissent queried whether the majority's decision
in Bragdon would open the doors to other diseases where the person
appeared outwardly healthy. The dissent worried that the argument
to qualify asymptomatic HIV infection as a disability "taken to its logi-
cal extreme would render every individual with a genetic marker for
some debilitating disease 'disabled' here and now because of some
possible future effects."5 With the rapid developments in mapping
out the human genome,6 these concerns are not unfounded.
Within the last few years, scientists have not only identified altera-
tions and changes within genes that lead to specific disorders, but they
have also developed tests to detect and predict genetic diseases that
* Eugenia Liu, J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, 1999. Manuscript pre-
pared under the mentorship of Barbara Fuller, Senior Policy Analyst at the National
Human Genome Research Institute.
1. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
3. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 633-35 (discussing HIV as a precursor to the terminal AIDS
virus).
4. See NATIONAL CANCER INST., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NIH PUB.
No. 96-3905, UNDERSTANDING GENE TESTING 1 (1995) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING GENE
TESTING].
5. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 661 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
6. See Justin Gillis, Md. 's Celera Finishes 'Rough Draft' of Human Genetic Code, WASH.
POST, Jan. 11, 2000, at E08 (stating that one private corporation has completed mapping
more than 80% of the human genetic code).
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have not yet manifested themselves. 7 As a result, a person could deter-
mine whether or not he carried the gene for diseases such as Hunting-
ton's disease or breast cancer years before the disease actually sets in.
Genetic predisposition to a particular disease and asymptomatic HIV
infection share some strong similarities under the Bragdon framework.
These similarities could lead a court to find that a person carrying a
particular gene is "disabled" years prior to the actual manifestation of
the genetic disease. However, the resolution of such a case may de-
pend on the type of genetic disease, the penetrance rate of the gene,
and the probability that the person's offspring will acquire the defec-
tive or altered gene.
Part I of this Article provides a background of Bragdon v. Abbott
and its impact in light of previous cases concerning HIV infection and
the ADA.8 Part II examines the feasibility of including genetic dis-
eases within the purview of Bragdon by assessing the case against two
very different types of genetic markers: the genetic predisposition to
Huntington's disease, which has a 100% manifestation rate,9 and the
predisposition to breast cancer, where the presence of the gene
merely indicates a greater probability of acquiring the disease."0 Part
III briefly explores the impact of three recent Supreme Court deci-
sions mandating the inclusion of any mitigating factors in determin-
ing what constitutes a disability.1' A discussion of whether genetic
predisposition to a disease could qualify under the "regarded as"
prong of the ADA as an alternative to the approach undertaken by
Bragdon follows in Part IV. 2
I. BWA GDON v. ABBoT - CLASSIFYING ASYMPTOMATIC HIV
INFECTION AS A DISABILITY
A. The United States Supreme Court's Interpretation of the ADA
in Bragdon
In 1993 Congress declined to include an exhaustive list of physi-
cal or mental impairments that would be considered a disability under
the statute.1" Following Congress' decision, a significant amount of
7. See UNDERSTANDING GENE TESTING, supra note 4, at 1.
8. See infra notes 13-73 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 79-95 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 113-137 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 138-152 and accompanying text.
13. See CatherineJ. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice: How Individual-
izing the Determination of "Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42 VIL. L. Rxv. 327, 333 (1997)
(discussing the impossibility of listing all the specific conditions, diseases, or infections that
would constitute a physical or mental impairment under the Act due to the difficulty of
2000]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
litigation arose in an effort to determine what qualifies as a disability.
Under the ADA, an individual may qualify as disabled under any one
of three criteria. According to the ADA, a person may possess a disa-
bility if she has "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) [could be] regarded as having
such an impairment."14 Courts examining whether to classify asymp-
tomatic HIV infection as a disability have generally focused on the first
prong of the ADA, which assesses whether asymptomatic HIV infec-
tion constitutes a physical or mental impairment that substantially lim-
its one or more of the major life activities." Prior to Bragdon, the
lower circuits were split on the issue of whether asymptomatic H1V
constituted a disability, with the Fourth Circuit finding that asymp-
tomatic HIV did not constitute a disability16 and the Ninth Circuit
holding that it did. 7
In Bragdon, Sidney Abbott contracted HIV in 1986 but remained
asymptomatic and did not exhibit any of the symptoms indicative of
full-blown AIDS. i" In 1994, she went to Randon Bragdon for a dental
appointment and disclosed on a patient registration form that she had
HIV. 19 Bragdon discovered a cavity during his examination and in-
formed Abbott that he could not fill cavities of HIV-infected patients
within his office, but he offered to perform the work at a hospital.20
Abbott declined and brought suit against Bragdon under state law and
§ 12182 of the ADA, alleging that he had discriminated against her on
the basis of her disability.21
The district court held that "asymptomatic HIV constitutes a
physical impairment for the purposes of the ADA,, 22 and that it sub-
ensuring the comprehensiveness of such a list when new disorders may develop in the
future).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1999).
15. See EEOC v. R. J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999); Ellison v. Software
Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996); Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc., 100 F.3d
907 (1lth Cir. 1996); Madjlessi v. Macy's West, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Cal. 1997);
Cortes v. McDonald's Corp., 955 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
16. See Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that
a person with HIV, who lacked physical symptoms, did not have a disability per se); Ennis v.
National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995) (same).
17. See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that HIV is a
"disability" whether it is symptomatic or asymptomatic because of the possibility of
transmission).
18. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 628 (1998).
19. See id. at 628-29.
20. See id. at 629.
21. See id.
22. Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 585 (D. Me. 1995).
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stantially limited Abbott's major life activity of reproduction. 23 The
First Circuit affirmed, citing regulations issued by the EEOC and
other legislative history suggesting that asymptomatic HIV qualifies as
a physical impairment under the ADA.24
The Supreme Court agreed with the First Circuit and held that
asymptomatic HIV infection did qualify as a disability under the first
prong of the ADA because it constituted an impairment that substan-
tially limited the major life activity of reproduction. 25 Finding the sci-
entific studies on the development of the disease from HIV infection
to AIDS compelling, the Supreme Court held that from the moment
of infection, "HIV infection satisfies the statutory and regulatory defi-
nition of a physical impairment during every stage of the disease."26
The Court engaged in a detailed and highly technical description of
the effects of HIV infection before reaching its decision. Describing
with specificity the primary infection stage of HIV, the Court cited
studies concluding that the initial HIV infection stage is often associ-
ated with mono or flu-like symptoms that emerge early and then
abate while the HIV antibodies appear in the bloodstream. 27 The
Court noted that the "assault on the immune system is immediate"28
and that the "victim suffers from a sudden and serious decline in the
number of white blood cells." 29 Asymptomatic HIV was even deemed
a "misnomer" because the studies revealed that, even during this
stage, the virus remains active and migrates to the lymph nodes where
the assault on the body continues.3 1 Consequently, the Court con-
cluded that "HIV infection must be regarded as a physiological disor-
der with a constant and detrimental effect on the infected person's
hemic and lymphatic systems from the moment of infection."3'
The Court then turned to the second part of the first prong of
the ADA disability determination requiring that the disability limit a
23. See id. at 586.
24. SeeAbbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1997) (asserting that according to
EEOC guidelines, HIV, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, is a disability under the
ADA).
25. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641-42.
26. Id. at 637.
27. See id. at 635. According to the Court, "mononucleosis-like symptoms often emerge
between six days and six weeks after infection, at times accompanied by fever, headache,
enlargement of the lymph nodes (lymphadenopathy), muscle pain (myalgia), rash, leth-
argy, gastrointestinal disorders, and neurological disorders." Id Following this description,
the Court launches into a discussion of the progression of the disease including an expla-
nation of the CD4+ counts and the clinical symptoms associated with this stage. See id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 637.
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major life activity. Stressing that "[r]eproduction and the sexual dy-
namics surrounding it are central to the life process itself, '3 2 the
Court found that reproduction "falls well within the phrase 'major life
activity.' "3 Furthermore, the Court concluded that reproduction was
"substantially limited" by Abbott's HIV infection and justified its con-
clusion on two public health concerns: that the woman would pose a
significant risk of infection to both her partner and, through perinatal
transmission, to her child. 34 The Court rejected Bragdon's conten-
tion that HIV was not substantially limiting because certain drug ther-
apies could reduce the risk of perinatal transmission to about 8%,
stating that "[i]t cannot be said as a matter of law that an 8% risk of
transmitting a dread and fatal disease to one's child does not repre-
sent a substantial limitation on reproduction."35 As additional sup-
port for its decision, the Court referenced the legislative history and
administrative interpretations on HIV as a disability,36 as well as previ-
ous judicial decisions concluding that asymptomatic HIV did qualify
as a substantially limiting disability. 7
B. What Bragdon Accomplished in Light of Other Cases on HIV
Prior to Bragdon, the lower courts addressing HIV and the ADA
reached opposite conclusions depending on the focus of their ADA
assessment. The Fourth Circuit held that HIV did not constitute a
disability within the purview of the ADA, in Runnebaum v. Nationsbank
of Md. and Ennis v. National Ass 'n of Business and Educational Radio, Inc.
The court stressed the individualized nature of an ADA disability anal-
ysis3" and strictly focused on the individual's particular symptoms as
well as whether those symptoms restricted that particular person's ma-
jor life activities. 39 The Ninth Circuit directed its attention to the na-
ture of the disease and its effects in determining that asymptomatic
HIV did fall within the provisions of the ADA.4 ° The Supreme Court
32. Id. at 638.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 639-40.
35. Id. at 641.
36. See id. at 629-33 (discussing the development of the ADA and the historical context
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare regu-
lations, and the President's Executive Order No. 12250).
37. See id. at 644.
38. See generally Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 163-72 (4th Cir.
1997); Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 59-61 (4th Cir.
1995).
39. See generally Lanctot, supra note 13.
40. See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994). In Gates, prison inmates
alleged that a prison policy segregating HIV-positive inmates from other inmates and ex-
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in Bragdon appeared to adopt the latter approach, and while the Court
did not establish a new standard for assessing disabilities under the
ADA, it nonetheless broadened and generalized the scope of analysis.
Both Runnebaum and Ennis involved plaintiffs alleging wrongful
termination from their employment on the basis of discrimination
against their disabilities.41 In Runnebaum, the Fourth Circuit com-
menced its discussion by emphasizing that a finding of a disability
under the ADA statute requires an individual inquiry.42 Reiterating its
holding in Ennis,43 the Fourth Circuit rejected the claim of an em-
ployee with asymptomatic HIV and once again stressed that the "'indi-
vidualized focus' contemplates a case-by-case determination of
whether a given impairment substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of the individual."44 By claiming that the ADA stat-
ute was clear and unambiguous the Runnebaum court dismissed the
legislative history which suggested that asymptomatic HIV infection
could be a disability.4 5 Thus it did not require a searching inquiry
cluding them from food service jobs at the prison violated the Rehabilitation Act, a prede-
cessor to the Americans with Disabilities Act. See id. at 1444-45. In holding that the HIV-
positive inmates did qualify as individuals with a disability, the court noted that "the physi-
cal impairment to the individual is not the issue, but rather the issue is the contagious
effect of the HIV virus." Id. at 1446. However, relying on a Supreme Court decision that
stated "the contagious effects of a disease could not be meaningfully distinguished from
the disease's physical effect on the claimant," the court refused to make a distinction be-
tween HIV-positive individuals and individuals with full-blown AIDS. Id. (citing School Bd.
v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282 (1987)). As a result, the Ninth Circuit focused on the nature
and effect of the disease as a whole and concluded that it is "the possible transmission of
the virus to others that is the basis of the individual's disability under the provisions of the
Act." Id This Article specifically examines the impact and accomplishments of the
Supreme Court's decision to accept asymptomatic H1V as a disability in Bragdon. Conse-
quently, a fuller discussion of the previous cases accepting asymptomatic HIV as a disability
will not be used as a point of comparison.
41. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 163 (explaining that Runnebaum claimed that his em-
ployer violated the ADA because of his HIV-positive status); Ennis, 53 F.3d at 57 (describing
Ennis' claim that she was protected under the ADA as an individual known to have a rela-
tionship or association with a person with a known disability and the allegation that her
employer violated the ADA in terminating her because of fears that her HIV-positive son
would increase insurance rates for the company).
42. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 166; Ennis, 53 F.3d at 59.
43. See generally Ennis, 53 F.3d at 55. Addressing whether a woman qualified as an ADA-
protected class member through her relationship with a person with a known disability,
her HIV-positive son, the Ennis court held that the plain language of the ADA "requires
that a finding of a disability be made on an individual-by-individual basis." Id. at 59. The
Ennis court pointed out that the statute "is specifically defined, for each of the subparts...
'with respect to [the] individual' and . . . 'that the underlying impairment substantially
limit a major life activity of the individual.'" Id. As a result, it laid the framework for
Runnebaum by concluding that the language clearly required an individualized focus for
determining a disability.
44. Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 166.
45. See id. at 168-69.
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into legislative background to ascertain what Congress intended to in-
clude under the term "disability." As a result, the Fourth Circuit fo-
cused on the plain definition of "impairment."
Relying on various dictionaries, the court in Runnebaum found
that most defined impairment as a "decrease," "deterioration," or "di-
minishing" of some aspect46 and consequently held that "asymptom-
atic HIV infection is simply not an impairment [because] without
symptoms, there are no diminishing effects on the individual."47 De-
spite its finding that the absence of any diminishing effects prohibited
asymptomatic HIV infection from qualifying as a disability, the court
acknowledged that the ADA required an individualized assessment
and examined the particular circumstances surrounding the plain-
tiff.4 8 However, the court still failed to find a disability in light of the
plaintiff's statements that he was not handicapped because his state-
ments signified "his own belief that he suffered no disability."49
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court in Bragdon closely
examined the legislative history, agency interpretations, and adminis-
trative guidelines."0 Reasoning that Congress borrowed the term "dis-
ability" from the Rehabilitation Act in enacting the ADA, the Supreme
Court determined that "Congress' repetition of a well-established
term carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be
construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpreta-
tions." 1 The Supreme Court found that these pre-existing regulatory
interpretations all pointed to the conclusion that the Rehabilitation
Act protected both symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV infected indi-
viduals.52 Consequently, the Court concluded that these interpreta-
46. See id at 168. "Impair" is defined as to "make worse by or as if by diminishing in
some material respect." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 581 (10th ed. 1986).
The court also considered other definitions, including, "to weaken, to make worse, to
lessen in power, diminish, or relax, or otherwise affect in an injurious manner" and "to
diminish in quality, value, excellence or strength. ... " BLACK'S LAw DIcrIoNARY 752 (6th
ed. 1990).
47. Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 168.
48. See id. at 169.
49. Id.
50. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642-47 (1998).
51. Id at 631.
52. See id. at 647. The majority cited a 1988 opinion by the Office of Legal Counsel of
the Department of'Justice (OLC) which stated that the Rehabilitation Act "'protects symp-
tomatic and asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals against discrimination in any covered
program.'" Id. at 642 (quoting 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 264, 264-65 (Sept. 27, 1988)).
Moreover, the Court pointed out that Congress employed the same definition in the Fair
Housing Amendments Act, and the Court found it compelling that the Department of
Housing and Urban Development had interpreted the definition to include HIV-infected
individuals. See id at 645.
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tions confirmed its holding that asymptomatic HIV infection did
qualify as a disability under the ADA.5 3 The Fourth Circuit in Run-
nebaum was able to reach the opposite decision because it briefly ex-
amined the legislative history of the ADA, rather than reaching back
to the interpretations found under the Rehabilitation Act. Further-
more, the Runnebaum court found that the Committee Reports and
legislative history for the ADA did not "distinguish between sympto-
matic and asymptomatic conditions" and thus "d[id] not answer
whether asymptomatic HIV infection [was] an impairment under the
statute."54 Thus, the Runnebaum court refused to delve into the legis-
lative history to determine Congress' intent and instead applied the
plain meaning of the word "impair." By employing different methods
of statutory interpretation, the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court
fall on opposing ends of the spectrum.
While the Runnebaum court also considered procreation and sex-
ual relations as the "major life activity" limited by the disability, it ex-
pressed hesitation over accepting procreation as a "major life activity"
and failed to find convincing evidence that sexual relations did consti-
tute a major life activity. According to the Fourth Circuit, "[w] e agree
that procreation is a fundamental human activity, but are not certain
that it is one of the major life activities contemplated by the ADA." 5
On the other hand, the Supreme Court expressly held that procrea-
tion and reproduction fell within the statute's purview. Drawing upon
the appellate court opinion that held that the term "major". "'denotes
comparative importance' and 'suggest[s] that the touchstone for de-
termining an activity's inclusion under the statutory rubric is its signif-
icance,'"56 the Supreme Court concluded that reproduction
constituted a major life activity. Finding that "[r] eproduction and the
sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself,"57
the Bragdon Court held that reproduction fell within the statutory defi-
nition of "major life activity."58
The Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court also had divergent
approaches to determining whether asymptomatic HIV infection sub-
stantially limited the major life activity of procreation. In Runnebaum,
the Fourth Circuit found that an "individual's response to his knowl-
53. See id.
54. Runnebaur, 123 F.3d at 169.
55. Id. at 170.
56. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638 (quoting Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939-40 (1st Cir.
1997)).
57. Id.
58. See id.
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edge of his infection is 'not fully persuasive since it depends upon the
conscience and good sense of the person infected."' 59 Consequently,
the court held nothing inherent in the infection actually limited pro-
creation or intimate relations, and that any limitations resulted from
personal choice or reaction to the infection.6" The Supreme Court
rejected this notion in Bragdon and stated that "the disability defini-
tion does not turn on personal choice."'" The Court supported its
decision by referencing scientific reports on the transmission rates of
HIV to both the sexual partner and the child.62 Despite evidence
presented by the petitioner that antiretroviral therapy could reduce
the risk of perinatal transmission from 25% to about 8%,63 the Court
stressed that "[i] t cannot be said as a matter of law that an 8% risk of
transmitting a dread and fatal disease to one's child does not repre-
sent a substantial limitation on reproduction."64 As a result, the Brag-
don Court seemed to focus more on the disease itself rather than on
how that particular person dealt with having the disease.
Thus, even though the Supreme Court did not expressly adopt a
new standard for assessing a disability claim under the ADA, its deci-
sion in Bragdon extended and broadened the scope of analysis em-
ployed for such claims. The noticeable absence in the Supreme
Court's majority opinion of any reference to the fact that the ADA
requires an "individualized inquiry" or any references to specific evi-
dence in the record indicating a substantial limitation of Abbott's own
ability to reproduce suggests the Supreme Court did not employ an
individualized inquiry. Despite the fact that the Court never explicitly
stated that it was departing from an individualized inquiry, its reliance
on scientific studies and administrative guidances reveals that the
Court, in effect, employed a generalized assessment of the symptoms
and effects arising from asymptomatic HIV infection. However, the
Supreme Court was able to depart from a strict individual inquiry
(case-by-case inquiry) because the First Circuit's approach to the ques-
tion from a broadened perspective in Abbott v. Bragdon65 paved the
ground for a more generalized holding. Even though the appellate
court acknowledged the ADA's call for an individualized inquiry, it
59. Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 171 (quoting Memorandum from Douglas W. Kmiec, Act-
ing Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr.,
Counsel to the President (Sept. 27, 1988)).
60. See id.
61. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641.
62. See id. at 639-40.
63. See id. at 640.
64. Id. at 641.
65. 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997).
[VOL. 3:382
ASYMPTOMATIC INDMDUALS
stated that "the need for this case-by-case analysis of disability does not
necessarily require a corresponding case-by-case inquiry into the con-
nection between the plaintiff and the major life activity."66 However,
most courts addressing ADA claims have opted for the more restrictive
approach, requiring a tight nexus between the individual plaintiff and
the major life activity. As one critic noted, "courts that have narrowed
ADA's protected class have done so by insisting that they are required
to engage in a 'case-by-case' analysis of each individual plaintiffs med-
ical condition, rather than an analysis of whether a particular impair-
ment inherently poses such a limitation."67
Both the Runnebaum and Ennis courts followed the narrow ap-
proach whereby "[e]ach symptom is then scrutinized to see whether
the claimant is truly 'substantially limited' by the particular set of
symptoms he or she possesses."68 In Runnebaum, the Fourth Circuit
determined that there was "no evidence in the record that Run-
nebaum, because of his infection, forewent having children or engag-
ing in intimate sexual relations," and nothing existed to suggest that
"Runnebaum was at all interested in fathering a child."6 Moreover,
the court emphasized that "the record makes clear that Runnebaum's
ability to engage in intimate sexual relations was not substantially lim-
ited by his HIV infection" because he "concealed his HIV infection
from his lover."70 While the Ennis court assumed that the child with
asymptomatic HIV infection was disabled after determining that the
record was not adequately developed, it nonetheless pointed to the
lack of evidence of any limitations on the child and noted that his
mother "candidly admitted that her son suffers no ailments or condi-
tions that affect the manner in which he lives on a daily basis."7 1 The
plaintiff in Abbott made similar statements, but the generality of the
approach adopted by the First Circuit is evidenced by its refusal to
consider such evidence in its decision. In her deposition, Ms. Abbott
replied "no" when asked, "'Are you impaired in your ability to carry
out any of your life functions by the fact that you are HIV-positive?"' 72
While the Fourth Circuit considered the plaintiffs statement that her
HIV-positive son was not affected in his daily living as an admission
that her son was not totally disabled, in Abbott, the First Circuit ex-
pressly condemned the use of such statements as mere attempts to
66. Id. at 941.
67. Lanctot, supra note 13, at 332.
68. Id.
69. Runnebaurn v. Nationsbank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 172 (4th Cir. 1997).
70. Id.
71. Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995).
72. Abbott, 107 F.3d at 942.
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"cast doubts on her sincerity. ' T3 It refused to consider such state-
ments as potential admissions that plaintiff did not suffer from a sub-
stantial limitation. Consequently, the absence of any discussions on
specific evidence in the record in Bragdon suggests that neither the
Supreme Court nor the First Circuit strictly adhered to a case-by-case
individualized analysis of the disability.
II. APPLICABILITY TO GENETIC PREDISPOSITION
In denouncing the extension of the term "disability" to include
asymptomatic HIV infection, both the dissent in Bragdon and the ma-
jority in Runnebaum noted the potential inclusion of persons, who
have genetic markers yet appear outwardly healthy, in the definition
of disability. The Runnebaum majority commented that
"[a] dvancements in genetic research.., have given doctors and scien-
tists the increasing ability to identify seemingly healthy individuals
who will develop various serious diseases,"74 and "[u]nder the dis-
sent's logic, such otherwise healthy individuals would be impaired for
purposes of the ADA."75 Chief Justice Rehnquist echoed this argu-
ment in his dissent to Bragdon, claiming that "[r]espondent's argu-
ment, taken to its logical extreme, would render every individual with
a genetic marker for some debilitating disease 'disabled' here and
now because of some possible future effects."76 However, given the
wide variations in the triggers and characteristics of genetic diseases,
their concerns may not hold true for all genetic diseases. In particu-
lar, predispositions to genetic diseases with an absolute manifestation
rate, such as Huntington's disease,77 is more likely to be classified as a
"disability" than genetic markers for diseases with a more questionable
manifestation rate, such as breast cancer.78 Under the Bragdon frame-
73. Id.
74. Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 169 n.6.
75. Id.
76. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 661 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part).
77. See Brian R. Gin, Genetic Discrimination: Huntington's Disease and the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1406, 1414-15 (1997). A person with Huntington's dis-
ease risks a 50% chance of passing the gene on to his children, and if the child has the
gene for Huntington's, there is a 100% manifestation rate. See Joseph S. Alper, Does the
ADA Provide Protection Against Discrimination on the Basis of Genotype?, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
167, 169 (1995). An individual with Huntington's disease "remains completely free of
symptoms until mid-life" when the individual begins to suffer from "an extended period of
dementia and loss of body control" until the individual succumbs to death. Gin, supra at
1414-15.
78. Even though the BRCA1 gene is a dominant gene that will prevail over a normal
gene, the gene merely indicates that the person is at a higher risk for breast cancer. Unlike
Huntington's disease which has a 100% manifestation rate, a person with BRCA1 has about
[VOL. 3:382
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work, a person harboring a predisposition to Huntington's disease
could possibly fall within the ADA's purview, while a person possessing
the BRCA1 or 2 alteration for breast cancer would have a much harder
argument to make under the ADA.
A. Predisposition to Huntington's Disease Is Likely to Qualify as
a Disability
In finding an "impairment," one author has asserted that both
HIV-positive individuals and individuals with the gene for Hunting-
ton's disease possess "current impairments." According to this argu-
ment, a person with the gene for Huntington's disease is currently
impaired because the presence of the gene signifies a "'defect in a
specific chromosome [that] can be identified as the beginning of a
genetic disease process in the same way as infection is identified as the
beginning of a contagious disease process."' 79 However, this argu-
ment is unlikely to succeed in light of the emphasis the Supreme
Court in Bragdon placed on the scientific evidence that individuals in-
fected with HIV suffer from immediate flu-like symptoms. The Court
stressed that the "assault on the immune system is immediate" with
the individual suffering from "a sudden and serious decline in the
number of white blood cells" and "[m] ononucleosis-like symptoms...
emerge... at times accompanied by fever, headache, enlargement of
lymph nodes, muscle pain, rash, lethargy, gastrointestinal disorders,
and neurological disorders.""° In fact, the Court went so far as to say
that asymptomatic HIV infection is a "misnomer" because "clinical fea-
tures persist throughout [this stage], including lymphadenopathy,
dermatological disorders, oral lesions, and bacterial infections.""'
On the other hand, unlike an infection that prompts the body's
immune system to launch an immediate defense to fight the infection,
a genetic alteration often lies dormant for years before triggering any
response from the body.8 2 An individual with the gene for Hunting-
ton's does not suffer any immediate assault to any bodily systems, nor
a 56% manifestation rate. SeeJeffery P. Struewing et al., The Risk of Cancer Associated with
Specific Mutations of BRCAI and BRCA2 Among Ashkenazi Jews, 336 NEW ENG. J. MEI. 1401,
1404 (1997). As a result, having the BRCA1 does not necessarily condemn the person to
having breast cancer later in life, but rather the person has a higher risk than someone
without the gene.
79. Gin, supra note 77, at 1425 (quoting Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of
Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 Am. J.L. & MED.
109, 126 (1991)).
80. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 635.
81. Id.
82. See Katherine Brokaw, Genetic Screening in the Workplace and Employers' Liability, 23
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 317, 321-22 (1990).
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does it elicit fevers, fatigue, aches, or other disorders that accompany
asymptomatic HIV. Aside from the presence of an altered gene within
the body, the Huntington's gene has no real or measurable effect on
the body until many years later when the clinical symptoms of Hunt-
ington's begin to appear."s Absent the development of a significant
body of scientific evidence suggesting that a person predisposed to
Huntington's disease suffers from similar ailments during the "asymp-
tomatic" stage, it will be very difficult to qualify genetic predisposition
to Huntington's as an "impairment" under the Bragdon framework.
In another effort to classify genetic alterations as an impairment,
Joseph Alper argues that "[a] n altered genotype is also a physiological
condition either because an altered gene associated with a disease is
incapable of producing the normal gene product in the appropriate
amounts or because its regulatory function has been compromised." 4
However, this argument fails to consider whether the physiological
condition affects any of the body's systems.85 Even if an altered gene
is a physiological condition, the altered gene does not produce any
clinical symptoms or have any measurable effects on any bodily sys-
tems. Consequently, such a classification will be unpersuasive in light
of the Bragdon Court's emphasis on the symptoms presented by asymp-
tomatic HIV.
However, a successful analogy between possessing the gene for
Huntington's disease and asymptomatic HIV may not be far off in the
future. Some scientific evidence is surfacing that Huntington's dis-
ease does impact the body years prior to the actual onset of the
clinical signs. One study of individuals at risk for Huntington's disease
has revealed that this at-risk population suffers major deficits in cogni-
tive tests.8 6 Similarly, another recent project showed that once a per-
son reached a certain amount of neuronal loss in the striatum, the
portion of the brain attacked by Huntington's disease, the clinical
signs of Huntington's disease begin to manifest, suggesting that some
striatal loss must occur before the actual symptoms of Huntington's
83. See Gin, supra note 77, at 1414-15.
84. Alper, supra note 77, at 168.
85. According to 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (2) (i) (1999), a physical impairment is defined as
.any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affect-
ing one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; ... repro-
ductive; ... lymphatic; skin; and endocrine ...." Id.
86. See Andrew D. Lawrence et al., Evidence for Specific Cognitive Deficit in Pre-Clinical
Huntington's Disease, 121 BRAIN 1329, 1333-34 (1998). This study was performed on those at
risk of obtaining Huntington's disease before they were actually tested for the gene and
before they knew whether or not they had the gene. See id. at 1330. Each participant was
subjected to cognitive tests, and the results showed that those who eventually had the gene
for Huntington's disease had major cognitive deficits. See id.
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disease surface.87 As a result, this process of "neuronal loss" could be
analogized to the decreasing CD-4 count"8 in a person suffering from
asymptomatic HIV, and the cognitive deficits could be representative
of the other physical impacts detailed by the Court of an HIV-infected
person. Furthermore, some evidence exists to suggest that those with
Huntington's disease are more susceptible to depression than those
who do not suffer from the disease.8 9 If scientists later find a defini-
tive link between the Huntington's disease gene and the chemical or
protein changes in the body that lead to depression, the presence of
depression could strengthen the host of "symptoms" experienced by
those predisposed to Huntington's. With the emerging evidence re-
vealing possible changes in the body years before the manifestation of
the disease, one can draw strong parallels between the "asymptomatic"
disease process of Huntington's and HIV infection.
If a court finds that predisposition to Huntington's does consti-
tute an impairment, a plaintiff with Huntington's disease should meet
the second prong of the definition of an ADA disability. A plaintiff
could easily prove that reproduction is the "major life activity" sub-
stantially limited by a predisposition to Huntington's, especially in
light of the relaxed nexus to an individualized assessment. The Court
in Bragdon emphasized that "[r] eproduction and the sexual dynamics
surrounding it are central to the life process itself'9 in reaching the
conclusion that reproduction qualifies as a "major life activity." Fur-
thermore, the Court concluded that asymptomatic HIV infection sub-
stantially limits reproduction in two independent ways: first, a woman
infected with HIV who engages in reproductive activities imposes a
significant risk of infection on her partner, and secondly, the woman
risks infecting her child through perinatal transmission.91 Even
though Huntington's disease cannot be transmitted to a partner dur-
87. See Jean Paul G. Vonsattel & Marian DiFiglia, Huntington Disease, 57 J. NEUROPA-
THOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY 369, 370 (1998). This study suggests that if one
could measure "neuronal" loss, one could feasibly argue that this is a physical "impair-
ment" experienced by the body years before the manifestation of Huntington's disease. See
id.
88. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 634 (1998) (describing CD4+ cells as white
blood cells that are particularly vulnerable to HIV). The Court further noted that these
cells "play a critical role in coordinating the body's immune response system, and the de-
cline in their number causes corresponding deterioration of the body's ability to fight
infections from many sources." Id.
89. See Gin, supra note 77, at 1434 n.105. The author notes that the suicide rate for
persons with Huntington's disease is four to seven times higher than the national average.
See id. (citing Peter Gorner, Out of the Shadow A New Genetic Test Can Foretell Agonizing Death:
Would You Take It?, CHI. TRiB., Aug. 4, 1988, at TI).
90. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
91. See id. at 639-40.
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ing reproductive activities, it does possess a high rate of transmission
to the child. In fact, Huntington's disease poses a higher risk of trans-
mission to the child than asymptomatic HIV infection. An adult with
Huntington's disease who attempts to conceive a child carries a 50%
risk of transmitting the Huntington's gene to the child, who would
then have a 100% chance of developing Huntington's upon reaching
middle age.9 2 Moreover, both asymptomatic HIV infection and pre-
disposition to Huntington's are fatal conditions, with both diseases
causing deteriorations to the body until the person finally succumbs
to death.9" In Bragdon, the Court specifically dismissed evidence show-
ing that antiretroviral therapy could reduce the risk of perinatal trans-
mission from 25% to 8%," and stated that "[i]t cannot be said as a
matter of law that an 8% risk of transmitting a dread and fatal disease
to one's child does not represent a substantial limitation on reproduc-
tion."9" In light of the Court's statement, the risk of transmitting an
equally dreaded and fatal disease at a transmittal rate that is twice as
high as HIV infection should also be found to "substantially limit" re-
production for a person with a predisposition to Huntington's
disease.
B. Predisposition to Breast Cancer Is Less Likely to be a Disability
A person carrying the breast cancer gene alteration faces greater
difficulties in analogizing a predisposition to breast cancer to asymp-
tomatic HIV infection. This is because, unlike Huntington's and H1V
which have 100% manifestation rates, BRCA1 and 2 merely increase
the chances that the disease will manifest itself. In both Huntington's
and asymptomatic HIV infection, the infection or presence of the ge-
netic marker condemns the person to eventual development of the
actual disease.96 On the other hand, the gene alteration for breast
cancer merely increases a woman's susceptibility to the disease. Thus,
a woman found to carry the BRCA1 or 2 gene alteration may have as
high as a 56% chance of developing breast cancer,97 and while the risk
is high, it is not an absolute or definite fate. A woman who possesses
the BRCA1 or 2 gene alteration and actually develops cancer could
possibly fit within the Bragdon framework pending the discovery of evi-
dence that during the asymptomatic stage and, prior to the actual
92. See Gin, supra note 77, at 1414-16.
93. See id. at 1406.
94. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 640.
95. Id. at 641.
96. See Gin, supra note 77, at 1414-16.
97. See Struewing et al., supra note 78, at 1401.
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manifestation of the cancer, actual changes occur in her body. How-
ever, if the same woman escapes the development of cancer and never
experiences the changes in her body leading to the manifestation of
cancer, she would not be deemed "disabled" under the ADA despite
the presence of a genetic marker. As a result, possessing a susceptibil-
ity gene for breast cancer bears a more tenuous connection to the
essential elements stressed by the Supreme Court than a predisposi-
tion to Huntington's disease does.
However, similar to Huntington's disease, if sufficient evidence is
discovered which supports a finding that a predisposition to breast
cancer qualifies as an impairment, a person with BRCAI or 2 will have
no difficulties satisfying the substantial limitation standard. Both
BRCA1 and 2 are dominant genes which have a 50% chance of being
passed through reproduction.9" A woman with a single defective copy
of BRCA1 or 2 is automatically placed at a significantly higher risk of
manifesting breast cancer, and this woman's child then risks a 50%
chance of inheriting that gene alteration.99 If the genetic alteration
does pass to the child, the child would face a 56% chance of develop-
ing a fatal cancer."' 0 As a result, a 50% chance of passing a gene alter-
ation for a dread and fatal cancer to a child should also lead a court to
find that a person with BRCA1 or 2 is substantially limited in her abil-
ity to reproduce.
C. Reproduction as a Major Life Activity Is Key in Extending Bragdon
The Court's acceptance of reproduction as a "major life activity"
actually has the largest impact on the potential inclusion of genetic
markers as a "disability." This is particularly true in light of other cases
that have refused to hold that cancer, despite being a physical impair-
ment, did not substantially limit work activities to qualify as a "disabil-
ity" under the ADA. The Eleventh, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits have
addressed situations where the plaintiffs suffered from cancer, but
nonetheless they each concluded that the cancer did not substantially
limit the plaintiffs major life activities.10 1 Work activities were the
"major life activity" considered in these cases. In Gordon v. E. L. Hamm
& Assoc., Inc.,"°2 the Eleventh Circuit determined that while the side
98. See UNDERSTANDING GENE TESTING, supra note 4, at 6.
99. SeeJerome Groopman, Decoding Destiny, NEW YORKER, Feb. 9, 1998, at 43.
100. See Struewing et al., supra note 78, at 1401.
101. See generaUy Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc., 100 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 1996);
Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1996); Ellison v. Software Spectrum,
Inc., 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996).
102. 100 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 1996).
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effects of chemotherapy could be a physical impairment under the
ADA, they did not substantially limit the plaintiff in this case. 10 3 The
Eleventh Circuit found this to be true due to the fact that the plaintiff
worked during chemotherapy, was not hospitalized at any time, and
conceded he could work and continue with normal life activities de-
spite his mild nausea. 0 4 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Sanders v. Arne-
son Prods., Inc.1" 5 held that the plaintiff's cancer-related psychological
disorders failed to qualify as a disability under the ADA because "'tem-
porary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no
long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities. "106 The
Fifth Circuit also applied a narrow ADA analysis and found that the
plaintiffs breast cancer did not substantially limit her major life activi-
ties because she continued to work on a modified schedule, and de-
spite feeling sick and fatigued, she was still able to perform the
essential functions of her job.' °7 In each of these cases, the courts
failed to find a substantial limitation of that individual's work activities
because that individual mustered the strength to continue to com-
plete their jobs and perform their normal life activities. Thus, these
courts primarily focused on the individual's response to the disease
and the effects the disease had on that individual, which provides the
courts with greater latitude in exercising their discretion as to what
constitutes a "substantial limitation."
Unlike the cases in which plaintiffs argued that cancer posed a
substantial limitation, each person possessing a particular genetic pre-
disposition for a particular disease will face the same rates of transmit-
ting that gene to their offspring. A person with Huntington's who
decides to reproduce or not reproduce will face the same risks that
another person with Huntington's will: both stand a fifty percent
chance of passing the gene for a "dread and fatal" disease to their
child. Similarly, any person carrying the BRCA1 or 2 gene alteration
faces the same fifty percent chance of increasing her child's suscepti-
bility to cancer. This restricts the discretionary latitude courts would
possess in assessing what constitutes a "substantial limitation" and pre-
vent courts from conservatively exercising their discretion as the
courts in the Eleventh, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits did to preclude indi-
viduals from invoking the protections of the ADA.
103. See id. at 912.
104. See id.
105. 91 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1996).
106. Id. at 1354 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630,2(j) (1999)).
107. See Ellison, 85 F.3d at 190-91.
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George Annas noted that the Bragdon Court's acceptance of "re-
production" as a major life activity could render the Court's decision
inapplicable in light of alternative reproductive technologies.1 °8 Ac-
cording to Annas, the Court assumed that the partner and the child
would be at risk because reproduction would be achieved through
traditional sexual intercourse and gestation."' While this argument
validly applies to asymptomatic HIV infection, the risk of transmitting
a genetic disease to a child will be present at all times, regardless of
whether or not reproduction is achieved through sexual intercourse
or with assisted reproductive technologies. With assisted reproduc-
tion, an HIV-positive woman could eliminate transmission risks to
both her partner and child because she could conceive without sexual
intercourse and use a surrogate mother to gestate the child. 110 As-
sisted reproduction eliminates perinatal transmission because the egg
does not carry the HIV virus."' By employing in vitro fertilization and
using a surrogate mother, the developing fetus would never be ex-
posed to the virus and never risk perinatal transmission of a "dread
and fatal disease." On the other hand, even if a woman with Hunting-
ton's disease or with BRCA1 or 2 employs alternative reproductive
technologies, her child will still face a 50% chance of inheriting that
disease because the disease is encoded in the genes of that egg. Conse-
quently, a person with a genetically based disease will always risk trans-
mitting a potentially "dread and fatal" disease to their child, l" 2
making the Supreme Court's acceptance of reproduction as the major
life activity more significant in an analysis of genetic diseases and the
ADA.
III. DEFINING DISABILITY IN LIGHT OF MITIGATING FACTORS
A. The Sutton, Murphy, and Albertsons Decisions
The Court significantly changed what qualifies as a disability
under the ADA by requiring the consideration of any mitigating fac-
tors in determining what constitutes as a disability. In Sutton v. United
108. See George J. Annas, Protecting Patients from Discrimination-The Americans with Disa-
bilities Act and HIV Infection, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1255, 1257 (1998).
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See Baccio Baccetti et al., Failure of H1V-1 to Infect Human Oocytes Directly, 21 J. Ac-
QUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 355, 357 (1999).
112. See Annas, supra note 108, at 1257. The risk of transmitting genetic diseases will
always exist barring developments in germline gene therapy, which manipulates, the ge-
netic material in reproductive cells to eliminate the disease causing genetic alterations.
Genetic scientists have yet to develop such a therapy for Huntington's disease or BRCAI
and 2. See id.
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Air Lines, Inc.,11 3 Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,1 1 4 and Albertsons,
Inc. v. Kirkingburg,1 15 each decided last term, the Court concluded that
one must account for mitigating factors in deciding what is a disability
under the ADA. Despite the fact that these three decisions arose out
of ADA claims in employment discrimination contexts, they nonethe-
less have an impact, upon whether genetic predispositions will be ac-
cepted as a disability under the Act. However, the Bragdon Court's
decision to recognize reproduction as a major life activity may have
limited the effect of these most recent ADA cases on treating genetic
predispositions as a disability.
In Sutton, the main case setting forth the mitigating factor re-
quirement, the Court addressed an ADA employment discrimination
claim brought by two severely myopic women, who were denied posi-
tions as commercial airline pilots.1 16 In rejecting their ADA claim, the
Court announced that "[a] 'disability' exists only where an impair-
ment 'substantially limits' a major life activity, not where it 'might,'
'could,' or 'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures
were not taken."1 17 The Court reasoned that "[b]ecause the phrase
'substantially limits' appears in the Act in the present indicative verb
form, we think the language is properly read as requiring that a per-
son be presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially lim-
ited in order to demonstrate a disability.""1 ' As a result, the Court
concluded that the two severely myopic women who wore corrective
lenses did not meet the ADA's definition of disability because with
corrective lenses, the women functioned as well as persons who did
not suffer from myopia."l 9 With corrective lenses, the two women no
longer had a "substantial limitation" which "actually and presently ex-
ist[s]. '"2 ° Consequently, mitigating measures such as corrective
lenses, medication, or other forms of treatment may render an indi-
vidual with an impairment no longer "impaired" or disabled as con-
templated by the ADA. The Court reached similar conclusions in
Murphy and Albertsons, where the Court respectively found that neither
a man taking hypertension medication to control his high blood pres-
113. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
114. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
115. 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
116. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143.
117. Id. at 2146.
118. Id
119. See id. at 2149.
120. Id. at 2146.
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sure12 1 nor a man whose body subconsciously compensated for his
monocular vision could qualify as disabled under the ADA.
122
B. The Impact of Mitigating Factors on Including Genetic Predisposition
as a Disability
While many regarded the Court's decision as a significant curtail-
ment of those protected under the ADA l2 1 these three decisions do
not change the outcome of Bragdon or the previous section's analysis
of extending the ADA to genetic predispositions. As mentioned in
the previous section, the first prong of an ADA disability determina-
tion rests upon three elements: (1) the presence of a physical or
mental impairment, (2) whether the impairment affects a major life
activity, and (3) whether the impairment substantially limits the major
life activity. The Court in Bragdon engaged in a full-scale ADA analysis
by examining whether or not asymptomatic HIV met each element of
the first prong. In Bragdon, the greatest obstacle lay in a determina-
tion that an asymptomatic condition qualified as a physical impair-
ment. On the other hand, in Sutton, Murphy, and Albertsons, the Court
never challenged whether the ADA claimants suffered from a physical
or mental impairment, 12 4 but rather focused on the third element of
"substantially limits" in their decision to adopt mitigating factors as a
part of an ADA determination.
121. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136 (discussing the claimant who was fired from his posi-
tion as a mechanic, which required him to drive motor vehicles, after employer deter-
mined that he did not qualify for a Department of Transportation health certification
because of his high blood pressure).
122. See Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2165-66 (claimant was fired from his position as a truck
driver because his amblyopia, an uncorrectable condition that caused extremely poor vi-
sion in one eye and in effect left him with monocular vision, prevented him from meeting
the Department of Transportation vision standard).
123. See generally David G. Savage, High Court Reins In Disability Law's Scope, L.A. TIMES,
June 23, 1999, at Al ("The Supreme Court sharply narrowed the reach of the federal an-
tidiscrimination law for people with disabilities Tuesday, ruling that it was not intended to
protect workers with treatable impairments such as bad eyesight, hypertension or diabe-
tes."); see a/soJoan Biskupic, Supreme Court Limits Meaning of Disability, WASH. PosT, June 23,
1999, at A01 ("The Supreme Court significantly curtailed the scope of a federal law
designed to protect disabled workers from discrimination yesterday.").
124. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147 ("To be sure, a person whose physical or mental im-
pairment is corrected by mitigating measures still has an impairment, but if the impair-
ment is corrected it does not 'substantially limi[t]' a major life activity."); Murphy, 119 S. Ct.
at 2137 ("Because the question whether petitioner is 'disabled' when taking medication is
not before us, we have no occasion here to consider whether petitioner is 'disabled' due to
limitations that persist despite his medication or the negative side effects of his medica-
tion); Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2167 ("There is no dispute either that Kirkingburg's amblyo-
pia is a physical impairment within the meaning of the Act.").
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The inclusion of mitigating factors also does not significantly
change the Bragdon Court's determination that asymptomatic HIV
substantially limits the major life activity of reproduction. In Bragdon,
the dentist asserted that Abbott could have taken antiretroviral ther-
apy to lower the risk of perinatal transmission from 25% to about
8%.125 While the Bragdon Court noted the argument raised in Sutton,
Murphy, and Albertsons, that a substantial limitation should be assessed
with regard to mitigating factors, the Bragdon Court refused to resolve
that dispute. 126 Brushing aside the issue of mitigating factors, the
Court nonetheless concluded that even if the mother had taken an-
tiretroviral drugs, a reduced 8% risk of transmitting a fatal disease
does substantially limit the major life activity of reproduction. 127 The
Court emphasized that "[t] he Act addresses substantial limitations on
major life activities, not utter inabilities, ' 128 and that "the definition is
met even if the difficulties are not insurmountable. ' 129 As a result,
even if mitigating factors were injected into the consideration of Brag-
don, it would have no bearing on the Court's finding that asymptom-
atic HIV constitutes a substantial limitation on reproduction.
Similarly, an assessment of whether or not genetic predispositions
are a substantial limitation on a major life activity is not the main ob-
stacle to classifying it as a disability under the ADA. The current diffi-
culties in classifying genetic predispositions following Bragdon lie in
the lack of concrete evidence that the body presently experiences
physical manifestations or symptoms of the genetic alteration. The
Court's adoption of mitigating factors has merely crystallized the need
for an impairment not only to preside in a person's body, but to have
an actual effect on a major life activity. A genetic alteration in an
individual's body is capable of meeting this requirement. Even
though a genetic predisposition to Huntington's disease or breast can-
cer may not immediately trigger physical manifestations of the dis-
ease, the gene still presents a real and measurable effect on the
decision to reproduce. The presence of a genetic alteration within an
125. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 640 (1998). Antiretroviral therapy can lower
the risk of perinatal transmission to about 8%. See id.
126. See id. at 641. The Court acknowledged the Solicitor General's argument in an
amicus curiae brief that regulatory language "requir[ed] the substantiality of a limitation
to be assessed without regard to available mitigating measures." Id. at 640 (internal cites
omitted).
127. See id. The Court stated that the issue of mitigating factors did not need to be
resolved in order for the Court to decide the Bragdon case. See id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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individual will substantially limit an individual's ability to reproduce1 3 0
and thus goes beyond the point where it "might," "could" or "would"
substantially limit one's decision to reproduce. An individual carrying
the Huntington's disease or BRCA1 gene will always face a 50%
chance of transmitting the gene for the fatal disease or cancer to their
child.' Consequently, a genetic alteration with a 50% chance of
passing a terminal illness to a child will affect an individual's decision
to have a child, and in turn, the genetic alteration will presently and
substantially limit an individual's ability to reproduce.
C. The Impact of Developments in Genetic Therapy
Meanwhile, the developments in genetic therapy could frustrate
attempts to include genetic predispositions under the ADA's protec-
tion. With asymptomatic HIV, antiretroviral therapy would not com-
pletely eliminate the risk of perinatal transmission but would reduce
the risk to 8%. However, genetic therapy could completely eliminate
the risk of transmitting an altered gene. 32 In light of the Bragdon
Court's acceptance of reproduction as the limited major life activity,
germ-line gene therapy, which involves manipulating the genetic ma-
terial in reproductive cells, could constitute a mitigating factor consid-
ered in genetic alterations such as Huntington's and BRCA1 which are
passed from generation to generation.133 Once genetic scientists have
successfully mapped out the human genome and identified the genes
responsible for triggering certain cancers and diseases, 134 it will only
be a matter of time before scientists discover a method to correct the
alteration and enable a person to have a child free from genetic im-
pairments. The existence of genetic therapy would then render the
genetic impairment "correctable" so that the impairment would no
longer substantially limit reproduction, but only "'might,' 'could,' or
'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not
taken."135
130. See, e.g., Caryn Lerman, Interest in Genetic Testing Among First-Degree Relatives of Breast
Cancer Patients, 57 Am. J. MED. GENETICS 385, 386 (1995).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
132. See UNDERSTANDING GENE TESTING, supra note 4, at 18, 27.
133. See id. at 5, 28. Contrast with acquired mutations or somatic mutations which are
"changes in DNA that develop throughout a person's life." Id. at 5. Unlike hereditary
mutations, acquired mutations "arise in the DNA of individual cells," where "[ m]utations
are often the result of errors that crop up during cell division, when the cell is making a
copy of itself and dividing into two." Id. Radiation, toxins, and other environmental fac-
tors are often sources of such alterations. See id.
134. The Human Genome Project foresees complete mapping by 2002 or 2003, and
private corporations may complete it as soon as this year. See Gillis, supra note 6, at E08.
135. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146 (1999).
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The potential inclusion of genetic therapy in a calculation of
whether genetic predispositions qualify as a disability under the ADA
raises a host of prickly ethical questions: mainly that the making of an
ADA-type determination turns upon economic factors. Genetic test-
ing to determine if a person carries BRCA1 costs about $295.1"6 If
genetic testing alone, without subsequent gene therapy, costs $295, it
is extremely likely that the costs for genetic therapy will far exceed a
few hundred dollars. In describing the potential problems posed by
genetic testing, one author noted that "we live in a society where over
forty million people have no health insurance and limited or no ac-
cess to our health care system. Without access to health care, it is
unlikely that these individuals would have access to genetic testing or
related services."15 7 Such individuals, who find themselves unable to
bear the expenses of expensive gene therapy, could find themselves
protected by the ADA's provisions. These individuals would have an
identifiable impairment, the impairment would substantially limit the
major life activity of reproduction, and no mitigating measures would
exist to defeat an ADA claim. On the other hand, someone who had
the financial capacity to pursue gene therapy would find themselves
deprived of an ADA claim, as mitigating measures would remove any
substantial limitation to reproduction by eliminating the possibility of
transmitting the altered gene to future generations. Consequently,
under the Court's decision in Sutton, Murphy, and Albertsons, to include
mitigating factors in an ADA determination, the Court's acceptance of
gene therapy as a mitigating measure could inadvertently include a
socio-economic factor as well. While a more in depth discussion of
the ethical implications created by including mitigating factors in an
ADA determination for genetic predispositions is beyond the scope of
this paper, it seems that the Court's recent ADA decisions do not tech-
nically restrict the inclusion of genetic predispositions as a disability
but rather pose ethical questions as to its potential inclusion or
exclusion.
IV. PREDISPOSITION TO GENETIC DISEASE AS A DISABILITY UNDER THE
"REGARDED AS" PRONG
While establishing a claim under the first of the three ADA defi-
nitions poses many difficulties for those with genetic predispositions
to certain diseases or cancers, formulating a claim under the third
136. See Karen H. Rothenberg, Breast Cancer, The Genetic "Quick-Fix, " and the Jewish Com-
munity, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 97, 101 (1997).
137. Id. at 103.
[VOL. 3:382
ASYMPTOMATIC INDIVIDUALS
defintion-the "regarded as" prong of the ADA-is less problematic.
The "regarded as" prong defines disability as "being regarded as hav-
ing" an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities. 3 ' Based on the First Circuit's holding in Cook v. Rhode Is-
land, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals,'39 a person
with a genetic predisposition to a certain disease may find it easier to
establish a claim under the "regarded as" prong because this prong is
satisfied regardless of whether the person has an actual physical or
mental impairment.14 ° Consequently, if the altered gene or suscepti-
bility to depression and suicide do not qualify as "physical impair-
ments" for those with genetic predispositions, these persons could
nonetheless contend that they are perceived as being disabled be-
cause of stereotypes or myths.
Cook suggests that the "regarded as" prong provides a more prom-
ising route for classifying persons with genetic predispositions as "dis-
abled" under the ADA. In Cook, the First Circuit held that a morbidly
obese woman could have been "regarded as" disabled because her em-
ployer could have perceived her obesity as an impairment which sub-
stantially limited her major life activities.141 A closer examination of
the court's reasoning in light of genetic predisposition reveals that a
court could find that the person carrying the gene for Huntington's
disease, or breast cancer, may satisfy the elements for a "regarded as"
claim.
According to the First Circuit, the plaintiff in Cook could only pre-
vail on a perceived disability claim if she could show that "(1) while
she had a physical or mental impairment, it did not substantially limit
her ability to perform major life activities, or, alternatively, that (2)
she did not suffer at all from a statutorily prescribed physical or
mental impairment" in addition to showing that her employer
"treated her impairment (whether actual or perceived) as substantially
limiting one or more of her major life activities."' 42 In discussing
what constitutes a physical or mental impairment, the First Circuit
stated that "the regulations define the term 'physical or mental im-
pairment' broadly" and that the term "encompasses disorders and
conditions 'whose precise nature is not at present known."'" 4 The
court then determined that a jury could have found that the plaintiff
138. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1999).
139. 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
140. See id. at 22.
141. See id. at 23.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 22.
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had a physical impairment under both standards. First of all, a jury
could have found "morbid obesity is a physiological disorder involving
a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the neurological appe-
tite-suppressing signal system, capable of causing adverse effects."144
Alternatively the jury could have determined that while plaintiff was
not actually impaired, her employer treated her as impaired by failing
to hire her as evidenced by their concerns that her "limited mobility
impeded her ability to evacuate patients in case of an emergency, and
its fears that her condition augured a heightened risk of heart disease,
thereby increasing the likelihood of worker's compensation
claims."' 45 Furthermore, the First Circuit held that a jury could rea-
sonably find that the employer's "pessimistic assessment of the plain-
tifFs capabilities demonstrated that [the employer] regarded Cook's
condition as substantially limiting a major life activity-being able to
work.'
'1 4 6
The court's statement that the term "physical impairment "en-
compasses disorders and conditions 'whose precise nature is not at
present known'"147 could provide a hook for genetic predisposition.
This is because most genetic diseases are conditions whose precise na-
ture is not presently known. While scientists can locate the Hunting-
ton's disease gene or the breast cancer gene alteration and test for
them, the actual process of manifestation is not yet known. For in-
stance, scientists have some evidence that certain chemical changes
occur in the body prior to the actual onset of Huntington's 4 ' and
that certain environmental factors increase the probability of trigger-
ing breast cancer,'49 but they do not yet know the "precise nature" of
these diseases. In following the First Circuit's reasoning, a physical
impairment under the "regarded as" prong would include genetic
predispositions where scientists have not yet discovered the nature or
process of the disease.
A physical impairment may also exist if someone treated a person
with a genetic predisposition as having a physical impairment. Evi-
dence indicates that persons with genetic predispositions, such as a
Huntington's disease, suffer discrimination in adoption and employ-
144. Id. at 23.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 25. A physician for the employer admitted he "believed plaintiff's limitation
foreclosed a broad range of employment options in the health care industry ... " Id.
147. Id. at 22.
148. See INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND BIOLoGY 547 (1996) (stating that
"[t]his condition often gives rise initially to disorders of character and behavior such as
irritability, impulsiveness, violence, fugue, sexual aberrations, even suicide.").
149. See AcKERMAN's SURGICAL PATHOLOGY 1590 (Juan Rosai ed., 8th ed. 1996).
[VOL. 3:382
ASYMPTOMATIC INDIVIDUALS
ment contexts. 150 If evidence in such cases suggests that the refusal
arose from concerns that a person with a predisposition to Hunting-
ton's disease limits a person's ability to care for a child or that the
condition "auguer[s] a heightened risk" for depression and suicide
thus restricting a person's ability to function at the workplace, the lan-
guage of the First Circuit indicates that such a person would be
"treated" as having a physical or mental impairment. If the Cook court
found that the employer's concerns about the plaintiff's ability to
evacuate patients5 1 and her potentially increased risk for heart dis-
ease indicated that the plaintiff's obesity was treated as an actual im-
pairment, a court could similarly find that an employer, acting on
fears that a person with the gene for Huntington's is more susceptible
to depression and cognitive deterioration, perceives that person as
having an actual impairment limiting her performance. If others fur-
ther believe that the perceived or actual depression and cognitive de-
terioration restricts or substantially limits the person's ability to
function, then the person will meet the elements of a "regarded as"
claim.
As the First Circuit noted, under the "regarded as" prong, a "suit
can be brought against a warehouse operator who refuses to hire all
turquoise-eyed applicants solely because he believes that people with
such coloring are universally incapable of lifting large crates." 152 By
suggesting an employer's perception that a certain eye color dimin-
ishes a person's ability to lift crates would be sufficient to support a
claim under the regarded as prong, the First Circuit seems to open
the door to belief that persons with genetic predisposition are more
frail, cannot have prolonged exposure to chemicals or exposure to
mild radiation, as constituting sufficient evidence of perceived disabil-
ity. Drawing on this illustration, as long as an employer discriminates
against someone with a genetic predisposition on the grounds that he
or she believes a person with a genetic predisposition is not capable of
completing certain functions, that person should be able to recover
under a "regarded as" claim.
150. See id.; see also Lisa N. Geller et al., Individual, Family, and Societal Dimensions of Ge-
netic Discrimination: A Case Study Analysis, 2 Sci. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 76-78 (1996). This
article discusses various case studies including one where a married woman learned that
she was at-risk for Huntington's disease, and when she and her husband attempted to
adopt a child on the advice of her physician, the adoption agency denied their application
based on her risk for Huntington's disease. See id. at 77.
151. See Cook, 10 F.3d at 23.
152. Id. at 25.
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CONCLUSION
With the rapid developments in genetics, a person with a genetic
predisposition to Huntington's disease will probably succeed in bring-
ing a claim under the Bragdon framework. Evidence from recent stud-
ies indicates that certain changes and deficits do occur in the body
prior to the actual manifestation of Huntington's disease. The strong
parallels of the physiological impact on the body between asymptom-
atic HIV infection and a predisposition to Huntington's disease makes
it quite feasible that a predisposition to Huntington's disease will also
constitute an "impairment." Furthermore, Huntington's disease is an
equally "dreaded and fatal disease" with a higher rate of transmission
(50%) to the child than asymptomatic HIV infection (25% without
antiretroviral therapy, 8% with antiretroviral therapy). In light of
these statistics, a court should not hesitate to find that Huntington's
disease substantially impairs the major life activity of reproduction.
On the other hand, the success of an ADA claim using the breast
cancer gene alteration BRCA1 may depend on further genetic re-
search. At the moment, nothing indicates that those with BRCA1 suf-
fer from neuronal loss or increased susceptibility to depression as
those with the gene for Huntington's disease. Furthermore, BRCA1
merely increases the probability that the person will manifest the dis-
ease; it does not possess a 100% penetrance rate like Huntington's
disease. However, as a genetic disease, the acceptance of reproduc-
tion as a major life activity by Bragdon provides a hook for BRCAI and
other genetic diseases because these diseases can only be inherited.
The genes are firmly encoded in the egg and reproduction will either
give the child the disease or increase the probability that the child will
later manifest the disease.
While the Court's recent decision to adopt mitigating factors in
an ADA determination may restrict the class of persons qualifying for
ADA protection, it has little impact on a Bragdon examination of
Huntington's disease and BRCAl. The Bragdon Court acknowledged
mitigating factors arguments in its decision but nonetheless con-
cluded that even a reduced risk of a fatal disease was a sufficient limi-
tation on reproduction. However, even if a court refuses to find that
genetic predispositions fall within the Bragdon rubric, the "regarded
as" prong provides a strong alternative argument. This is because a
person with a genetic predisposition only has to be perceived as "im-
paired" and show that she or he was treated as having an impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity. Consequently, in light of
the Bragdon opinion, the protections offered by the ADA could extend
to those with genetic predispositions.
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